Tag Archives: employer abuse

Unions Are Obsolete? The New York 12 — Part 5


Today concludes our lesson on the importance of unions in today’s workplace environment, with a focus on public-sector unions in particular.  If you don’t belong to a union, you should consider it.  If your workplace doesn’t have a union, you should organize one.  If you work in a “Right to Work” state, remember that the whole phrase should actually be, “Right to Work . . . for Less, and Without Protections.”

* * *

NATCA’s Turn at Defense

After some preliminary evidentiary housekeeping, NATCA’s Attorney Bill Osborne presented NATCA’s case.  It wouldn’t take long.

Osborne:  “Have you rested?”

Head:  “Correct.”

Osborne:  “And we rest.”

That’s it.  If you blinked, you missed it.  So sure was Osborne that the Agency’s witnesses had destroyed their own credibility… when they weren’t busy destroying each others’ that is… that he rested.  His went on to state his rationale:

“We think that the Agency’s evidence is overwhelmingly condemning of what the Agency did.  They stipulated yesterday by their witnesses that the documentary evidence that we have already submitted is accurate and true.  We think that is more than ample record for you (Arbitrator Jaffe) to make your decision.  We also renew our motion for interim relief.  And we would be happy to give you oral argument or brief, but we want a decision in this case at the earliest possible time and we are hopeful of getting the case resolved before the holiday.”

From Arbitrator to Mediator:
The Home Stretch

Elizabeth Head realized by now that her case had been consigned quite literally to the trash bin.  Going off record, she proposed that the arbitrator mediate an immediate settlement, to which Bill Osborne readily agreed.  With that request Ira Jaffe took off his arbitrator hat and exchanged it for that of a mediator.

The result?

Four days later, with full back pay minus five days’ worth, the eleven controllers were escorted back into New York TRACON by then NATCA President John Carr.  The five days’ pay was a bone thrown to the FAA with the understanding that it in no way could be called a suspension, and that no mention or hint of a suspension could be uttered by the Agency or placed into the victims’ personnel records.

Despite that proviso, it took the Agency not even until the end of the day agreement was reached to break their end of the deal.  Because of intense Congressional interest, with direct inquiries from the offices of New York Senators Chuck Schumer and Hillary Clinton as well as Representative Timothy Bishop of New York’s First Congressional District, the Agency went into face-saving mode.  Spokespersons for the Agency went before the press and mislead the public when they characterized Jaffe’s withholding of five days’ pay as a ‘suspension’ that vindicated the Agency’s actions against these eleven controllers.

And what of the twelfth controller, the controller who had since transferred to Phoenix TRACON?  “Victim 12” had been the first of the NY 12 fired, and he was the last to be reinstated.  His case ended pretty much the same, only this time the Agency didn’t even bother going before an arbitrator.  In January of 2006, less than a month after the arbitration that reinstated eleven of the NY 12, the Agency awarded “Victim 12” full back pay and purged his records of the entire incident.

NATCA went twelve for twelve.  The Agency wound up paying back a total of almost 60 months’ worth of pay for work not performed, including in that back pay package what the controllers would have made in Sunday and holiday pay, night differential, and overtime.  All told, the Agency was out a conservatively estimated $600,000 in settlement money, and that figure doesn’t include incidental expenses such as the overtime necessary to cover for the loss of services of these twelve controllers or the attorney’s fees for both parties which the agency was now obligated to pay as a result of this humiliating loss.  Many officials were caught either lying outright in sworn testimony, or giving testimony that was so erroneous that they were unqualified to answer the questions posed them.  None of these individuals were ever disciplined, let alone terminated.  The reason why is simple:  They were merely following mandates from higher up the food chain.  Marion Blakey had fired her first warning shot across NATCA’s bow, and these people were the ones manning the cannon.

Culture change did not end with these arbitrations.  In fact, it got worse.  Much worse.  Nationwide, management began cracking down on even the slightest perceived infractions or abuses.  One of the New York 12 didn’t last a month back at work when, because of the unrelenting harassment, he resigned from the Agency after a fifteen-year career with an impeccable record.

With the implementation of the White Book all hell broke loose at many facilities, as management strove to portray NATCA as totally impotent.  I can list literally hundreds, if not thousands, of cases showing the pettiness with which management at the local level wielded its new-found power, but I won’t bore the reader.  I’ll just cite one, and once again it deals with “Mr. Green”’s coveted dress code… the one worth delaying and inconveniencing passengers; driving up airlines’ fuel and labor costs; and even endangering lives, property, and national security.  It occurred at one of this nation’s approximately twenty Area Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC).  If that sounds like an important facility, it most certainly is.  By the time the local manager, “Mr. H. Couture”, finished defining his own version of the dress code he came up with a twelve-page document that specified everything including pant length, heel height, number of pockets, color combinations, fabrics, and, unbelievably, even thread count of the clothing material.  The following email is but one example of the importance to “Mr. H. Couture” of this silliness:

Subject:  Dress Code

Greetings,

This week we have had a couple of questions about the dress code.  Guess with the warm weather it had to happen.  The policy is the same as we put out in September.  No shorts, no skorts, but Capri pants mid calf or longer are OK for females.  Seems some females have been wearing some shorts (city shorts) or Capris that are just below the knee .  These are not business casual.  Make sure we all are watching this.  For now I would just advise them not to wear them again and not send them home.  If it happens more than once then you may send them home.  Shoes for women was also a question.  Specifically how to we determine if the shoes are flats.  Best we could come up with is if it has any thickness of a heel then it is OK.

With us questioning the dress of female controllers some questions have come up about female FLM’s and OM’s.  Just remember the dress code for all FLM’s and OM’s is business not business casual.

The important thing is for us all to be consistent in our application of the dress code.

Thanks,
“Mr. H. Couture”

So, “Mr. H. Couture” fiddled while (Blank) ARTCC burned with losses in staffing, increases in both Operational Errors and Deviations, and mounting delays into and through the airspace for which he was responsible for managing.  Meanwhile, I’m sure the American taxpayer is left wondering:  While “Mr. H. Couture” was displaying his juvenile desire to be party to the haute couture establishment, is this really what he was being paid $172,200 (and a $1,500 bonus) in 2008 to accomplish?

And all through this lunacy the Agency continued to get its hat handed back to it in arbitration after arbitration after arbitration, eventually racking up settlements well into the millions of dollars and paying NATCA attorney fees running into the hundreds of thousands. By 2008 the annual employee satisfaction survey had the FAA at 216 out of 218 on the list of the government agencies for which to work.  Is it any wonder why — if the frozen wages didn’t drive out experienced, retirement eligible controllers — this petty, nonstop harassment did?

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Filed under Author, Aviation Safety, Opinion Piece, Writing

Unions Are Obsolete? The New York 12 — Part 4


Outraged yet?  You should be.  Tomorrow concludes our five-part series.  In the meantime, here is Part 4:

* * *

In the Library with
Miss Scarlett and Her Smoking Gun

Late that afternoon came the testimony of “Mrs. White”, National Employee Relations Program Manager.  It is through her testimony we first hear of a ‘Culture Change’ within the Agency — a change that was kept secret from those who would be on the receiving end of any resulting disciplinary action until such time as the Agency could identify an appropriate lamb to stake out and sacrifice.  The Agency struck pay dirt; they found twelve of them.

Elizabeth Head started off the questioning for the FAA, asking about her part in “Col. Mustard”’s decision to terminate these eleven controllers.

Head:  “What kind of role did you play?”

“Mrs. White”:  “Explained to him that we had some eleven reports of investigation, ROIs, that dealt with controllers leaving information off the 8500 forms, predominately dealing with failure to report doctors visits — well, all of them were around Workers’ Comp-related claims, and one of them dealt with leaving off a DWI.  One or two DWIs; I don’t recall how many.”

(Author’s note:  It was two DWIs.  In investigating this piece of testimony, I uncovered the fact this controller had indeed reported these incidents on previous Forms 8500-8 in the years in which they occurred — 1993 and 1996 respectively.  In either 2000 or 2001 the wording for DWI changed on Form 8500-8 to ask if you had ever incurred a DWI.  So, that year this controller once again responded in the affirmative.  After that he relied upon, “Previously reported.  No change.”  And it was to those subsequent forms that “Mrs. White” was referring.  Thus, her contention that this controller had failed to report these incidents and was attempting to falsify his Forms 8500-8 to hide this information from the agency appears to be a complete and utter fabrication… under oath.)

Head:  “So did you talk to Mr. “Col. Mustard” directly about the issues that you just testified about?”

“Mrs. White”:  “Yes.  I never talked to him one-on-one.  There was usually always somebody from the Eastern Regional Office involved.  It would have varied, you know, like maybe Joe Winkler, Steve Brienza, sometimes Mary Doyle if Steve wasn’t it.  Combinations, sometimes all of them.  No real one-on-one things I can think of other than maybe leaving messages when we were trying to arrange telecons.”

Head:  “Did you have anything to do with the recommendation or the actual charge in this case?”

“Mrs. White”:  “Yes, I did.”

Head:  “Can you tell us what that role was?”

“Mrs. White”:  “It is sort of the history lesson that I go through with a lot of managers when we are faced with dealing with 8500 forms in particular.  It kind of goes back a little of a history lesson, if you will.  Explained to him that back in the 2003 time frame it had come to our attention that there had been an indictment up in the New England Region and then shortly after that there had been two more.  I think the first was in May of ’03.  Then the other two came in September of ’03 and then December of ’03.  And it was during this process that we in HR Headquarters kind of went through a learning process.

“Through our biweekly — actually, we have telecons twice a month with our Labor Employee Relations community throughout the field.  And we inquire from Headquarters, what have you all typically been doing with these kinds of things?  That was when we learned that, much to our chagrin, our counterparts, that they had been viewed upon as pretty insignificant personnel actions.

“We at Headquarters were quite shocked by that.  We dealt with the Air Traffic people.  Now, mind you, that was before the ATO organization was established.  One of the ATX organizations.  I can’t remember what number.  Five-hundred, or something like that.  They also felt that this was pretty egregious behavior and needed to be dealt with on a much stronger basis.

“So from our shop dealing with our LER people and the Air Traffic organization dealing — at least we understood they did — communicate with their 500s, which are the division managers in the regional offices in their traffic, that this was something that was going to be viewed at a much higher level than what it had been.

“In the meantime, the people in New York — sorry — in New England who had been indicted went out on indefinite suspensions.  Then removal actions occurred.  And that is when we started to see sort of the culture of the Agency moving off the dime, if you will, over to dealing with it as the egregious behavior it was believed to be.”

Head:  “What advice did you give to “Col. Mustard”, you specifically?”

“Mrs. White”:  “Again, I went through this history lesson and I told him, you know, that, like I said, we were moving off the dime.  That is not to say that there weren’t still — the word maybe not had completely circulated out there, but what we were recommending out of Headquarters out of Air Traffic was to start removal.  Certainly the employee always got the reply right.  And after consideration of the reply, he may or may not ultimately decide to remove.

“So he agreed that was the position and the direction that the Agency was heading, as far as the attempt to have this culture change, he agreed to do that.  So we proceeded to prepare the letters for him.”

(Translation:  We’re changing the culture to inhibit controllers from filing OWCP claims.  We’re terminating those on whom we can find even the slightest little mistake in their paperwork.  You are going to go along with this new, unpublicized, totally unfair and probably illegal policy, aren’t you, “Col. Mustard”?)

So much for “Col. Mustard” being the ‘deciding official.’  He didn’t even author the termination letters, and he was directly pressured in his ‘decision’ all the way from FAA Headquarters, Washington.  This one piece of testimony is the arbitration winner for NATCA, but we will continue.

Head:  “Did you tell him about the range of penalties that included five days up to termination?”

“Mrs. White”:  “Yes.  We discussed the Table of Penalties as far as five days to removal.  Explained to him that, you know, like a five-day suspension, something more in that range — because everything that would fall into that category would be serious business, but we were looking at somebody submitting a time and attendance sheet for a pay period and not including maybe some leave they had taken or maybe not putting down all the amount of leave they had taken.  Something like that — more in line that, something that — it doesn’t rise to the egregiousness of the 8500 form.”

So, “Mrs. White” testifies, under oath, that deliberately defrauding the U.S. government on pay (theft, intentional falsification of government records, etc.) is somehow less an offense than inadvertently failing to check a box on a form concerning something the Regional Flight Surgeon was already privy to anyway.  The former deserves a five-day suspension; the latter deserves a life-altering, family threatening loss of livelihood, destruction of a life-long career, and loss of pension and lifetime financial security.  What an absolutely amazing and convoluted rationalization.  It’s a wonder she could say this without breaking into laughter… or trembling at the thought that she couldn’t possibly believe what she was swearing to under oath if she just followed the logic of it.

Mr. Osborne must have been salivating for his turn at cross-examination, and he wasted little time getting to the heart of the matter.  He started swinging with his very first question.

Osborne:  “Just who is it that consists of the culture of the Agency, by the way?”

“Mrs. White”:  “Who?”

Osborne:  “What is this ‘culture of the Agency,’ stuff?  Are there individuals that you consider consisting, embodying the culture of the Agency?”

“Mrs. White”:  “For the purposes of the 8500 form, it was certainly the Air Traffic Organization and HR Organization.”  (This directly implicates both “Mr. Green” and “Mrs. Peacock”.)

Osborne:  “Name them for me, please, the people that consist of this culture.  Name them for me, please.”

“Mrs. White”:  “Originally it was the ATX organization, we dealt with the division manager by the name of “TT“.  I am trying to remember who was ATX-1.  I think “PF” was ATX-2.”

Osborne:  “Up to July ’05 no one had ever been terminated for an 8500 form, isn’t that right?”

“Mrs. White”:  “No, they had been prior to that.”

Osborne:  “For falsification or omission?”

“Mrs. White”:  “Falsification.  I think there were a couple we had in the package that were inaccurate entries.  There were some misstatings and misrepresentations.  But for omission, I have to admit, this is the first time I know of.”

Osborne:  “What memos did you send out to the air traffic controllers about this change in culture?”

“Mrs. White”:  “None.”

Osborne:  “So you thought you’d surprise the workforce with this change in culture in increasing the severity of the penalties, that it would be nice to kind of surprise them with?  Is that what you were thinking?”

“Mrs. White” spars with Osborne over several questions, first rationalizing not advising employees of this change in culture, then claiming that starting with the thermonuclear option on discipline didn’t somehow violate the Agency’s contract with its employees.  Once again she claimed omission was ‘egregious’ behavior deserving of termination at the first offense.  Osborne would have none of it.

Osborne:  “That is your testimony?  You are telling the arbitrator that starting with removal, in your view as a national representative of management, that is your view, that that does not constitute a violation of the contract.  Is that right?”

“Mrs. White”:  “That is right.  That is the position of AHR and the Air Traffic Organization.”

Osborne:  “Who are these people?”

“Mrs. White” testified that this culture change began in 2003 and went on to list a few names behind this change.  It goes without saying that this culture change could not have taken place without the direct consent of the FAA Administrator — Marion C. Blakey.  Under further questioning “Mrs. White” admitted that no legal advice was obtained in this conspiracy to circumvent long-standing government policy on progressive discipline, to illegally intimidate controllers into foregoing OWCP claims for legitimate traumas, to violate the Agency’s contractual obligations under the collective bargaining agreement with controllers, and to avoid even the common decency — if not  moral obligation — to warn employees that they faced termination for heretofore lesser offenses.

During questions from Arbitrator Jaffe things got even dicier for the Agency’s case.

Jaffe:  “What did you explain to him “Col. Mustard” in terms of a recommendation, if any, on falsification on the one hand, omission on the other, potentially something else if that was in the mix?”

“Mrs. White”:  “Right.  Okay.  We explained to him about the falsification.  That, you know, is very legalistic if you will.  There is a specific intent to deceive that would need to be met.  Omission, on the other hand, we felt was exactly what happened.  We had some about doing falsification because you know, as Phil Barbarello (NATCA Regional Vice President, Eastern Region) was explaining to “Mrs. Peacock”, at the meeting in January (2005), well, they turned over the forms.  There was never an intent to deceive.

“The problem is that there is the two different systems of records that are going on.  Those forms are over here and the 8500s go over here.  Granted, we understand that a couple of the forms made it over to the medical records by accident, but it didn’t — we were concerned that when you look at the big picture of the FAA, was the Agency on notice?  And one might say, yes, they were.  But it was a supervisor who got it, that went over to Headquarters over here into personnel records rather than medical records.

(So… because the Agency has a messed-up, convoluted records system, we’ll just terminate these eleven controllers rather than fix it.  It’s for decisions such as this that “Mrs. Peacock” was paid $172,200 in 2008, “Miss Scarlet” $165,942 (plus a cash award of $2,500), and “Mrs. White” $131,770 (plus a cash award of $1,725) — all not including other non-salary benefits and compensations.  A lot of badly needed Air Traffic Controllers could be hired for those amounts, and the taxpayers would realize considerably more benefit as a result.)

“So we were explaining to him that the absolute — could we meet the threshold of absolute intent to deceive might be a little on the tough side.  Not impossible, but maybe a little on the tough side (Once again, notice how management takes the easy way out rather than doing the job for which they are paid… and paid quite handsomely?  If they could prove falsification they should have at least made the attempt.  In reality they just didn’t have a case, and “Mrs. White” knew it despite her testimony.).  So when we really sat down and looked at it, what happened here?  They omitted the information.  They shouldn’t have omitted the information.  It precluded the AMEs (Aviation Medical Examiners) from being able to assess, properly assess their medical conditions as they are filing their forms.”

(This assertion is patently false as it flies in the face of the Eastern Region’s Flight Surgeon’s letter claiming that the OWCP claims were irrelevant to his certifications of the eleven physicals in question.  Was “Mrs. White”’s testimony merely an act of omitting this fact, or did she blatantly falsify this accusation altogether?  In “Mrs. Peacock”’s Human Resources division, does it really matter either way?  So, why hasn’t “Mrs. White” been disciplined, let alone terminated?  I contend that those in managerial positions who are party to the destruction of careers and livelihoods should have been held to a higher standard than lower-level employees, especially when under oath.)

“Mrs. White”:  “You know, it was like we just didn’t really know why they would omit that information.  Was it because they wanted to deceive the Airspace Medical Examiners?  As an absolute?  We don’t know.  But did it have a serious impact in our opinion?  Yes, it did.  It precluded them from being able to do their job.

“So, you know, we said, ‘You could go with omission.  We feel it is just as serious.  It falls into that general category on the Table of Penalties just as is allowed for in the NATCA contract.’  As it says in the Table of Penalties, not every conceivable charge is going to be included on the Table of Penalties.

“So, he thought about it and he ultimately decided that felt more comfortable with the omission.”

(“Mrs. White”’s tortured gyrations on the witness stand continued as she testified that controllers were held to a higher standard than other employees because of their safety-related positions.)

“Mrs. White”:  “Again, we felt that you are talking air traffic controllers, who are held to a higher standard in the agency for a number of matters.  For instance, alcohol- and drug-related issues.  They are held to higher standards than anyone else in the agency.  Truth and forthrightness in filling out that form, they are held to a higher standard.  Hardly anybody else in the Agency has medical standards.  They do.  They are held to a higher standard.

“The Aviation Medical Examiner is a private physician who does not have access to Agency records, does not have access to the Workers Comp files, does not have access to the medical records the Flight Surgeon has.  That doctor has to rely solely on the information the controller tells him or her.  And when they opt not to do that, for whatever reason it is, and particularly when it is repeated as it was in a number of cases here, we felt it was very, very serious.

“We felt clearly it was an omission.  We felt clearly it fell within where you discuss misstating information, falsifying information and that type of thing.  It is just as serious.  We just did’t want to lose by not being able to clearly, clearly, define what the reason for the deceit was.”

There is just one problem with “Mrs. White”’s above statement:  The entire premise is a complete and utter fabrication.  Remember where we discussed being allowed to put on Form 8500-8 the phrase, “Previously reported.  No change,” for those previously reported visits within the past three years?  The AME performing these examinations does not have access to the previous years’ forms (unless this particular AME performed those previous physicals and just happened to have retained copies), and thus cannot refer to them to see what was ‘previously reported.’  Those forms are sent along with other data accumulated during the annual physical to the Regional Flight Surgeon.  Clearly this form is for the certifying medical official only — the Regional Flight Surgeon who makes the final determination as to a controller’s fitness to continue working for another year.

If “Mrs. White” and the numerous officials with whom she claims to have conferred didn’t know this, then they are revealed to be total incompetents.  If on the other hand they conspired to concoct this blatantly false rationale, then they have violated federal laws.  Either way, through incompetence or malfeasance, they are unfit for government service… at least by FAA Human Resources’ hideously convoluted reasoning.

“Mrs. White” then conceded that a controller might make visits to a doctor that could be omitted but wouldn’t be a violation of the Table of Penalties.  She cited as an example an ingrown toenail.  Yet, somehow, omitting a check in Box 18 denoting mental conditions, conditions of which the Agency was already aware as was the Regional Flight Surgeon who authorized these people to return to duty, was a crime worthy of firing.

Then came the question as to why, if these controllers were deemed no longer trustworthy by the Agency (in the guise of the deciding official), they were allowed to continue working on the boards as controllers right up until the actual letters of proposed termination went out.  Indeed as previously shown during “Col. Mustard”’s testimony, one controller received his letter as he came off the mid shift.  Pre-letter, the ATM has full faith and confidence in the controller; post-letter he doesn’t.  She was unable to explain this obvious contradiction and claimed to have had no part in “Col. Mustard”’s decision to run his facility in this manner.

One can easily surmise that, if “Col. Mustard” indeed knew he was eventually going to claim loss of confidence in the controllers when they received their letters, then he must by definition have been endangering the flying public by allowing these same controllers to work aircraft prior to receiving their letters.  Deliberately endangering the flying public, by the way, is basis for removal from this profession — be you an Air Traffic Controller or the manager of one.  In 2008 “Col. Mustard” was paid by the U.S. taxpayer $172,200 (and an additional $3,000 cash award) for making such momentous, life-endangering decisions.

With the end of “Mrs. White”’s testimony, so ended the Agency’s case before the arbitrator.  The hearing adjourned until the following day, Thursday, December 8, 2005.

* * *
Tomorrow — “Don’t Blink or You’ll Miss It”
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Unions Are Obsolete? The New York 12 — Part 1


Over the course of this week I’ll be doing something a bit different.  Please bear with me, but this is something about which I have grown very passionate, and with good reason as you’re about to see over the next five days.

That’s right.  This week there will be five posts rather than the normal three, and none of them will deal with the usual.  Nevertheless, I hope you’ll stick with me through to the end.  It’s that important.  We’ll get back to having fun next week.  I promise.

This Labor Day week I intend to answer with an excerpt from an unpublished book the silly and misguided charge that unions in general (and public sector unions specifically) are either obsolete of have no true need in today’s world.

Prepare to be positively outraged as you read about a very specific federal government abuse that occurred in just one agency.  Once you read about the horrendous abuses heaped on mission-critical federal employees, you’ll never again look at public sector unions as unnecessary or a burden to the taxpayer.  Thankfully the conditions reported upon this week no longer occur in today’s Federal Aviation Administration; but given another perfect storm of a labor-hostile administration, a compliant Congress disinclined toward oversight of one of their own in the White House, and an unqualified and antagonistic political hack placed in charge of this safety-critical agency, and all that could change again in a heartbeat.

This article has to do with the abuses imposed on this nation’s air traffic controller workforce under the direction of former FAA Administrator Marion C. Blakey.  If it reads like a Perry Mason story, that’s because it takes place in a courtroom of sorts.  The testimony is factual and under oath, and as with Perry Mason the real villains crumble at the end to implicate both themselves and their conspiracy.  But unlike Dragnet, names in this sordid tale have been changed to protect (unfortunately) the guilty in addition to the innocent.

* * *

Before we continue, let me inform the reader what the Federal Aviation Agency does whenever an air traffic controller is caught lying to an FAA Security Investigator during the course of an investigation, and bear in mind that during such investigations that the controller is not placed under oath.  Routinely in such cases, the Agency declares that the employee (controller) has lost the trust of the Agency and the flying public for demonstrated dishonesty.  That employee is then more often than not terminated from government service without recourse.  Surely, one would surmise, lying under oath is even more serious an offense and agency managers should be held to a higher standard, right?

Wrong.

And lest anyone labor under the impression that it’s all about the money, consider what the Agency began doing on the disciplinary front.  Collectively, they are known to controllers throughout the country as ‘The New York 12’ even though one of them had been reassigned to Phoenix TRACON from New York TRACON when he received word that he, along with eleven others, was to be fired.

Controllers are of course under a tremendous amount of pressure to do everything correctly, every day, 100% of the time.  No exceptions.  When they don’t — when two airplanes get too close together for instance — it is called an Operational Error (or at least it used to be).  If a controller allows an aircraft under his control to enter another controller’s airspace without approval, that is known as an Operational Deviation.  Controllers call them OEs and ODs for short, or more euphemistically as, “Having a Deal.”  I had one ‘deal’ in my career, an Operational Deviation, and I can personally testify to the tremendous stress such an incident causes.  Most notably, it shakes your confidence, and confidence in one’s ability is a controller’s most important asset.  It’s what allows him or her to plug into position day in and day out, confident in their ability to protect the lives aboard the aircraft for which they are responsible.

But Operational Errors and Operational Deviations are not the only shocks to the psyche a controller faces.  An aircraft incident or accident, especially one resulting in loss of life, is very traumatic even when the controller had nothing to do with that loss.  Even a particularly bad session on position, say running heavy traffic around particularly hazardous weather for instance or even merely witnessing another controller having a particularly close near miss, can be sufficiently unnerving so as to cause a controller to question his or her own abilities.  Indeed, after very traumatic situations, controllers can and do suffer from everything from anxiety all the way up to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  Not all controllers, of course.  Everyone handles stress differently.  But such situations can and do occur.

A controller having a crisis in confidence, or even experiencing a bout of nerves while on position may need to take some time off to put things back into perspective, regain one’s confidence, or just get away from the job for a while.  When this occurs, it is not unheard of for the controller to file a CA-1 indicating an on-the-job related injury, a CA-16 requesting authorization for examination and treatment of said injury, and an OWCP (Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs) claim for time off not charged to the controller’s accumulated annual or sick leave, to reimburse the controller for medical treatments (mental health professionals in this case) not covered by insurance, and other expenses.  Are such claims ever filed frivolously?  Of course.  There will always be someone somewhere who abuses the system.  However such instances are rare and there are ways to handle such bogus claims and avenues to discipline any controller abusing system… if management is doing its job.

Forms CA-1 (injury) and CA-16 (examination and treatment) claims for mental stress become a part of that controller’s medical file.  OWCP (reimbursement) claims are the purview of the Department of Labor, but they are reviewed by the FAA’s Human Resources division.  And since in such claims the controller is basically telling the FAA that they are mentally unprepared for duty, the Regional FAA Flight Surgeon must review each case before a controller is allowed to return to controlling traffic.  This same Regional Flight Surgeon also reviews the annual physicals all controllers are required to take during the month of their birthday.

During these routine annual physicals, the controller is required to fill out a Form 8500-8 on which they must report all medical treatments received during the last three years, the healthcare professionals who supplied treatments, and contact information for those healthcare professionals.  If there is no change from previously reported information, the controller is given the option of placing in remarks the words, “Previously reported.  No changes.”  Makes sense.  Why report all treatments for the previous three years on an annual form on which treatments have already been noted in preceding physicals or through other channels?  These forms are also reviewed by the Regional Flight Surgeon as part of the controller’s annual physical results.

Additionally on these forms, in Section 18, are a vast series of checkboxes asking for known medical conditions past and present (Have you ever experienced…) such as dizziness, high blood pressure, etc.  Item M of Section 18 is for, “Mental disorders of any sort: Depression, anxiety, etc.”  That Item M is what got these controllers in trouble.  It was left unchecked.  But, then, Item M is pretty vague if not entirely subjective.  How does someone not in the mental health field know if their treatment meets the medical definition of, “Depression, anxiety, etc.,” unless they are specifically told that by their mental health practitioner?  And besides, once again, the Regional Flight Surgeon already had this information.  The NY 12 were, in effect, being persecuted for failing to check one box out of many on a highly complex, small-print form with poor instructions, while sitting in a doctor’s office waiting to be called in for their physical to begin, not knowing how much time they had left to complete the form.  More than once I have had my Form 8500-8 kicked back to me by my Regional Flight Surgeon because I omitted something (for instance the box asking if you have ever been arrested for DUI is very easy to miss; I’ve inadvertently skipped that one at least twice in my career—And, no, I’ve never had to report one on my form).  It is not a rare occurrence among controllers, and almost never is it done intentionally.

So, annual physicals, the accompanying Forms 8500-8, Forms CA-1, Forms CA-16, and OWCP claims are all reviewed by the Flight Surgeon having jurisdiction for that particular region.  In the case of annual physicals and Forms 8500-8, the Flight Surgeon reviews these before renewing a controller’s medical certificate for another year.  With OWCPs, the Flight Surgeon reviews treatments and prognoses before declaring a controller mentally fit to return to duty.

In the case of the NY 12, these controllers had complied with all reporting requirements save two:  They failed to check the box on Item M of Section 18, and since they knew that the Regional Flight Surgeon already had in his possession their Forms CA-1 and CA-16, they considered repeating the same information on their annual Form 8500-8 an unnecessary redundancy.  “Previously reported.  No changes.”

The FAA disagreed, but not for the reason you think.  If it were merely an omission, the Regional Flight Surgeon would just kick the form back for correction as they have me on several occasions.  This was diabolically different.

NATCA arbitration specialists and top leadership at the time suspected that Agency officials, in particular ATO VP for Terminal Services “Mr. Green” and FAA Human Resources run by “Mrs. Peacock,” were looking to curtail what they considered frivolous Forms CA-1 and CA-16, OWCP claims, and the resulting paid time off from work.  FAA Management could have gone to the trouble of documenting alleged abuses and taken corrective disciplinary action in individual cases, but that sounded too much like work.  So instead they chose to go for the thermonuclear option as a first-response to a perceived problem:  The Agency forwarded these alleged omissions for federal prosecution, claiming specifically that the controllers had knowingly falsified their Forms 8500-8.  The penalty for falsifying a Form 8500-8 is five years in prison, a $250,000 fine, or both.  When federal prosecutors wisely declined prosecution because the Regional Flight Surgeon was in fact aware of the information through other means (the Forms CA-1, CA-16, and other documentation contained in the respective medical files), the Agency began termination procedures.  In due course all twelve were fired from government service, some within a couple of years of retirement eligibility.

The primary reason for this drastic action came out in testimony before an arbitrator when NATCA filed appeals on behalf of the NY 12 who by this time had been out on the street for the better part of half a year, struggling to make mortgages, put food on the table, and even keep their families afloat and together until they had their day in court.  It was termed, ‘Culture change.’  FAA Human Resources colluded with “Mr. Green” to ‘change the culture’ within the controller ranks to inhibit controllers from filing future OWCP claims.  The trouble is that no one bothered to tell controllers that such a culture change had been implemented, and that they faced everything from potential federal felony prosecution to termination of their livelihoods.  It was all done in secrecy.  Why?  As then NATCA President John Carr noted, once again the Agency was out to break the union.  In this case, Agency officials targeted a select group of employees and attempted to destroy them publicly, personally, and financially.  If they succeeded, if NATCA had been unable to prevent or overturn these terminations, top managers within the Agency reasoned that NATCA would be perceived a toothless organization upon which the general membership was wasting union dues money.

The trouble is that somebody had to lie under oath to carry out this scheme.  No arbitrator is going to stand by and allow the Agency to arbitrarily change the rules, fail to notify its employees of those rule changes, and then fire employees without warning, all in the name of ‘Culture Change.’  Additionally for this conspiracy to work, it becomes important to convince the arbitrator that the decision as to what discipline to mete out was made at the lowest possible level — in this case the Air Traffic Manager (ATM) for New York TRACON.  If the decision goes much higher, especially if it reaches all the way to FAA Headquarters Washington, the fairy tale of motivation begins to unravel.

But do arbitration witnesses testify under oath?  I was originally unaware that they do.  Indeed, I was advised by one of NATCA’s arbitration specialists that they did not.  But it turns out that witnesses are placed under oath, and that arbitration hearings have the full weight and substance of an administrative court, with the arbitrator having the power of an administrative judge.  I discovered this while I was corresponding with one of the NY 12 with whom I was in contact for the research of this book.  He indicated that he had attempted to have at least one high-level FAA manager charged with perjury in the case.  Stunned at this revelation, I asked him for documentation that witnesses were in fact placed under oath during the proceedings.  As proof he sent to me transcripts for three days of the arbitration hearings, which clearly show that witnesses gave testimony only, “… after having been first duly sworn….”

A Game of Clue
Is That Blood on Your Knife, Mrs. Peacock?

Now let us now play a little game of Clue, studying the arbitration transcripts supplied to me by my NY 12 contact, to see if we can determine who told the truth and, most importantly, who potentially committed a felony by lying under oath.  The following paragraphs contain actual information and testimony from the arbitration hearing for the eleven New York TRACON employees terminated.  Explanations and author’s notes are in parenthesis.  The arbitration for the twelfth former New York employee, terminated from Phoenix TRACON, was handled separately.

First up is “DH,” Special Agent, Inspector General’s Office, Department of Transportation (DoT IG).  He was duly sworn on December 5, 2005.  His testimony shows that the decision to investigate the NY 12 was made in July of 2002, and that originally there were twenty individuals under investigation.  The initial investigation was for questionable, possibly fraudulent OWCP claims, but that evolved over time to a narrowing to fourteen individuals and a claim that they had falsified their Forms 8500-8.  “DH”’s reports on the fourteen were sent back to the FAA over a period of several months, between March and September of 2004.

Three final notes on “DH”’s final ROIs (Reports of Investigation):

First, the original number of controllers under investigation numbered twenty.  Six were deleted for unspecified reasons, including interestingly two members qualifying for protected minority status who would have had ready access to EEO (Equal Employment Opportunity) avenues for potential discrimination complaints if charged.  One of the six, and the one who arguably had the worst record of abusing OWCP claims, had become a supervisor and was thus now a member of the management team.  Remember, management don’t eat their own unless you violate one of the aforementioned cardinal rules.  These omissions brought the number down to fourteen.

Second, out of those fourteen, two of the controllers in question had since left the agency — one through retirement and one through resignation.  That is how the fourteen became twelve.

Finally, Attachment 19 of “DH”’s reports specifically stated that any action taken should not include federal prosecution, but rather should be limited to administrative punishment.  Someone in his office made this recommendation to him based upon what he termed mitigating circumstances that did not warrant criminal prosecution.  I’m just guessing here, but I’m willing to bet that Security knew there is a huge difference between an act of omission (missing a checkbox) and an act of commission (intentionally falsifying a document), and that absent proof of the later one cannot get a conviction for falsification.  At any rate as previously noted, several people within the ATO and HR weren’t listening to that recommendation.  These people were going for throats like a vampire just coming off a low-sodium diet.

On December 5, 2005, “Mr. Green” was duly sworn, and then under oath testified repeatedly that, although he had actively reviewed the cases against the NY 12 as they progressed and had access to the ROIs and other evidence, and even though he discussed the case with, “HR folks,” he had nothing to do with the final disciplinary determinations.

For someone who had no direct input on disciplinary action, “Mr. Green” was unusually involved in reviewing all the evidence and discussing the case with various entities, including Human Resources.  But without contradictory testimony, any suppositions based upon this observation are worthless.  Let us continue.

Next up, after being duly sworn that day in early December, was “Miss Scarlet”, Executive Director, Human Resources Management Programs Policies.  From her testimony the plot thickens.

“Miss Scarlet”:  “It’s a lot of attention on Workmen’s Comp.  It’s actually Flight Plan (agency stated) goals for cost avoidance.  Trying to bring people back to work quicker, trying to make sure claims are controverted, if people are filing on fraudulent claims, make sure we controvert those.”

Later on she was asked, “Is that function, the OWCP function, is that within the FAA’s jurisdiction or is that another government agency?”

“Miss Scarlet” replied, “It’s the Department of Labor, actually, has Office of Workers’ Compensation.  So they, for instance, when someone files a Workers’ Comp form, we look at it, see if it’s been controverted, make sure all the information is on there.  The supervisor would also be doing the look-see to make sure all the information is included, and then it’s forwarded to the Department of Labor, Workers’ Comp program, for a decision on whether the claim can be accepted or not.”

“Miss Scarlet” has in those words shown that the Agency’s first reaction to an OWCP is to ‘controvert,’ or in other words oppose and dispute, any and all OWCP claims before they are transmitted to the Department of Labor (DoL), the agency that actually has jurisdiction in the matter.  The problems with this are manifold.  Noncontrollers within the Agency are making determinations as to whether a controller is mentally fit for duty, something for which they are not trained and for which they have no personal background or experience.  They are, in essence, practicing medicine (in this case mental health) without a license.  Agency personnel are doing this even though it is beyond their jurisdiction.  Federal guidelines call for disputing claims only if there is evidence of fraud, which in ten of these eleven cases was never alleged nor found.  Also, federal law prohibits an agency from doing anything that inhibits or otherwise intimidates someone from filing a claim, which is clearly the intent when cases are routinely disputed at the Agency level without cause.  Clearly, the FAA’s Human Resources (HR) Department under “Mrs. Peacock” did not care about this violation of the law.

(“Miss Scarlet” then goes on to backstroke on her answer.)

“So we are more than just ‘passers of paper’ but we want to make sure that the records are clear and that they go to the right parties.  But they (DoL) make the final decisions as far as whether the claims are accepted or not, and whether doctors are paid and how long someone’s disability or actually how long somebody is out for.”

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Tomorrow — “Controverting Claims”
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