April 11, 2011 · 12:01 am

127 Hours vs. Nordwand (Movie Reviews)


Here’s a neat little experiment—a double movie review.  Both of the following deal with similar themes:  Mountaineering, man versus the cruel vagaries of nature, and man’s innate drive to survive against impossible odds.  The first is 127 Hours, for which James Franco’s performance garnered a nomination for Best Actor at this year’s Academy Awards.  The second is Nordwand (North Face), a film about which you’ve probably never heard.  And that’s really unfortunate, because in a head-to-head analysis 127 Hours in my opinion falls far short in a comparison of the two films.

127 Hours

Drama (Based on a true story), U.S., 2010, 94 minutes, directed by Danny Boyle

Medium:  Netflix Blu-Ray (Available on DVD)

Rating:  3.5 (5-point system)

Versus

Nordwand (North Face)

Foreign Drama (Based on a true story), German, 2008, 121 minutes, directed by Philipp Stölzl

Medium:  Netflix Streaming (Available on DVD)

Rating:  5.0 (5-point system)

First up, 127 hours:

James Franco plays real-life mountaineer Aron Ralston, a cocksure loner who likes to pit himself against nature on his weekend jaunts into the wilderness.

While rappelling into a crevasse, Ralston falls and dislodges a large boulder.  His right arm is pinned between the boulder and a solid rock wall, trapping the young adventure seeker whose only gear and supplies include a cheap knife, a multi-function tool similar to a Leatherman, a flashlight, rope, a little food and even less water, a video camera, and absolutely no communication with the outside world.

For five days Ralston tries everything he can think of to free himself, including one very clever scene in which he rigs a makeshift pulley system.  Eventually he realizes there is no escape . . . at least none that includes retaining his right arm.  By then his knife is so dulled from chipping away at the boulder that the blade will not even penetrate his skin.  The only equipment still offering any chance of escape are the pliers and wire cutter built into his multi-function tool.  It’s a gruesome yet inspiring moment when a dehydrated and hallucinating Ralston begins the slow, excruciated job of self-amputation and devising his escape from the crevasse.

Unfortunately, at least for me, Ralston’s character comes off as an extremely well-prepared and physically capable outdoorsman with one near-fatal flaw—he’s so confident in his abilities that he neglects the cardinal rules of survival:  Don’t travel alone, and always leave word where you’re going.  As such, it was fairly hard for me to stomach his initial arrogance and, later, to muster very much sympathy for his plight.  Eventually, however, Franco’s performance won me over and in the end I did start to root for the character he portrayed.

Alas the film is flawed.  Franco’s performance, while good to borderline great, was not in my opinion truly Oscar-worthy.  And, even at a short 92 minutes, the film still seemed overly long.  That’s never a good sign.

Next, Nordwand (North Face):

So hungry was I for a more satisfying real-life outdoor adventure film after watching 127 Hours that I almost immediately went to my Netflix streaming queue to retrieve a film I had placed there over a month before.  That film was Nordwand, a German word that translates to North Face.  If you know anything about mountaineering, or if you’re a fan of Rodney William Whitaker’s outstanding 1972 spy thriller The Eiger Sanction (written under the pseudonym Trevanian), the title alone will send shivers down your spine.  And isn’t that the reaction you expect from such a story?  When one mentions, “The North Face,” those in the know immediately think of the infamous North Face of the magnificent Swiss Alp the Eiger, a climb that has claimed the lives of no less than 64 mountaineers since the first serious attempt made in 1935 on what would become known as, “The last great problem of the Alps.”

Nordwand details the true-life 1936 attempt to climb the North Face of the Eiger mounted by German climbers Andreas Hinterstoisser (Florian Lukas) and Toni Kurz ( Benno Fürmann), who in mid-climb would later joined forces with Austrians Willy Angerer (Simon Schwarz) and Edi Rainer (Georg Friedrich).  Kurz is the reluctant climber who considers the Eiger’s North Face far too dangerous.  Kurz’s childhood friend and current mountain climbing companion Hinterstoisser disagrees, and Hinterstoisser eventually badgers Kurz into taking up a challenge many consider sure suicide.  Also pressuring Kurz is former childhood sweetheart Luise (Johanna Wokalek), who views documenting their attempt as her breakout ticket in photo journalism.

Kurz and Hinterstoisser soon find themselves encamped at the base of the Eiger, having arrived by bicycle, living in a tent, near penniless, and surviving on barley soup made over a campfire.  Meanwhile spectators, the press, and even Luise party in grand fashion and formal clothing, gorging on gourmet food and swilling fine wine at the nearby luxury hotel.  The dichotomy between the high-living death-watchers situated on the overlooking hill and the various encamped, glory-seeking climbing parties below is both stunning and demoralizing.

Kurz and Hinterstoisser begin their arduous climb before sunrise early one morning.  Austrians Angerer and Rainer start out shortly after, vowing to catch and then pass the Germans as each team vie to be the first to conquer the North Face.  Eventually the Austrians link up with the German team after Hinterstoisser discovers a brilliant but technically very difficult traverse that reveals to the four climbers the one route that had eluded everyone who made the North Face attempt before them.  Unfortunately, the team makes a decision that later proves disastrous when they remove and take with them the ropes Hinterstoisser used to traverse the most dangerous and unforgiving portion of the mountain.  From that moment on the team’s fate is sealed.

Disaster strikes high on the sheer rock when, first, Angerer is struck by a falling rock dislodged by a climber above and receives a severe concussion, and then when the weather turns the North Face into an ice-shrouded death chute for which the climbers are ill-prepared and unequipped.  From then on it’s a battle for their very lives as they reverse course just shy of their goal, the dead weight of the injured Angerer strung among the three remaining able-bodied climbers.  They decide their only hope for survival lies in reaching the Eigerwand Viewpoint, a tunnel railway station scenic lookout some 9,396 feet up the side of the 13,025-foot tall Eiger.

The climbing scenes in Nordwand are as stunning and breathtaking as the scenic locations in which they were shot.  By the end of the movie you can almost feel the stinging frostbite on your exposed face and hands, the sharp pain of overexerted muscles and sinews, the overwhelming fatigue of five nearly sleepless night encampments tethered to an icy cliff, and the dull, pounding headache of oxygen deprivation.  This movie truly has everything that 127 Hours lacks, from superb acting to heart-pounding action and flawless direction.  And whereas 92 minutes seemed a tad too long for 127 Hours, the 121 minutes of Nordwand will leave the viewer amazed at just how fast two hours can pass.

This is truly a must-see cinematic event.

Interesting Side Note:  You’ll recall that I earlier mentioned one of my favorite spy thrillers (actually a very clever parody of the genre), The Eiger Sanction.  Please don’t confuse this magnificent novel with the rather tepid 1975 film adaptation starring Clint Eastwood.  If you’ve not read this book, I would highly recommend that you do so after viewing Nordwand.  The climbing scenes from Trevanian’s novel were obviously patterned almost piton-for-piton from the 1935 Hinterstoisser/Kurz assault on the Eiger, clear down to the concussed climber and the sudden, catastrophic, mid-Summer ice storm.  You’ll be amazed at the similarities, and Trevanian’s descriptions are even more effective than even the brilliant Nordwand at putting the reader up on the North Face, the last great problem of the Alps.

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April 9, 2011 · 12:06 am

Another Controller Falls Asleep


Well, this is embarrassing.  It’s happened again.  Another controller fell asleep while on duty.  But in this case it appears this controller will soon be out on the street looking for work.  And this is one case I’m not even going to begin to try to defend.

Regular readers of this blog will recall that we’ve already discussed this in a previous case that occurred in the Control Tower at Reagan Washington International Airport back on March 23.

Well, now Don Brown has stepped into the fray with his own take on this matter.  I’ve known Don for many years.  Like me, Don is also a retired controller, but whereas I worked in the terminal tower and radar options, he worked in the en route option.  Don is also a safety perfectionist.  Don authors one of the most respected Aviation Safety blogs out there, and for many years he wrote a monthly column entitled Say Again? for AvWeb.

Don must know what he’s talking about because he agrees with me (that’s a joke, people).  People die because of poor staffing, and Air Traffic Control in this country is both woefully and critically understaffed thanks to you-know-who.  So, what does Don have to say about this latest rash of controllers falling asleep on the midnight shift?  Let’s take a look and find out.

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April 7, 2011 · 11:30 pm

Why Southwest’s Boeings Keep Coming Apart—Part III


As you’ve already seen from this week’s previous two blog entries, things were getting dicey, but not for Southwest Airlines and not for the FAA managers who were covering for Southwest.  Rather, things were going from bad to worse for the dedicated FAA inspector who was struggling to do his job and protect the flying public against overwhelming odds and threats of retaliation.

Today I present the final portion of Chapter Five of The Tombstone Agency:

Chapter Five
Why Inspectors Don’t Inspect
Unlawful Retaliation at the FAA
(Continued)

Meanwhile as Boutris continued working the AD Management SAI, he found himself suddenly ordered to cease the inspection while only two pages into the seven-page report.  He had already uncovered twenty-one problem areas when Mr. G ordered him to turn over all his assignments, including the ongoing SAI.  Now assigned to two other inspectors (including interestingly Mr. C.), the SAI went from twenty-one negative findings in only two pages, to fifty positive findings and only eight negatives in the full report—an astonishing turn of events that, upon scrutiny of the report, could not be justified by the numerous inconsistencies contained therein.

Bear in mind that this report was to analyze Southwest’s ability to manage and track their compliance with Airworthiness Directives, a system which Southwest had already proven was in shambles by the mere fact that their aircraft routinely missed required AD inspections, and even flew in illegally unsafe conditions for years without corrective action.  Also recall that when Southwest realized passengers were being flown in unsafe, illegally maintained aircraft, the airline did not know within fifty or more the true number of aircraft affected.  It is inconceivable that this performance warranted an SAI garnering fifty favorable findings and only eight negative ones.  One is rightfully left wondering what negligence would need to be demonstrated to earn a failing report from Mr. G.’s office and his hand-picked, pro-Southwest inspection team.

But what of Mr. Boutris, the dedicated inspector who first blew the whistle on this exploding scandal?  Why were his duties suddenly turned over to other inspectors, inspectors handpicked by Mr. G.?  On April 9, 2007, Bobby Boutris found there was a price to pay for going up against Southwest Airlines.  An anonymous letter purportedly written by a Southwest Airlines mechanic stated that Boutris had expressed anger at Southwest for having denied him a job.  More seriously, the author also claimed that Boutris boasted of successfully circumventing airport security by smuggling a weapon aboard an airliner.  No proof was offered.  No corroboration given.  Just an anonymously written letter with absolutely nothing to back up the serious, career-jeopardizing allegations contained therein.

Mr. G. immediately embraced this letter as grounds for exiling Boutris to desk duties, keeping him well away from Southwest, their aircraft, mechanics, and Southwest’s AD tracking systems, and more importantly at this point, the ongoing SAI.  In other words, what Southwest could not do overtly by direct request, someone within Southwest managed to do covertly under the guise of an anonymous letter.  In the end Southwest proved that they indeed did have final veto authority over which FAA inspectors would be allowed access to their operation.

FAA Security immediately launched an investigation into the allegations.  This alone is enough to strike terror in even the most honest and upstanding FAA employee.  The author of this book has personally seen this office in action.  They seldom arrive in the field without a preordained, management-directed finding, looking for ways to substantiate already drawn conclusions.  Seldom if ever does the initiating management official find their actions questioned.  Instead the target of the investigation is invariably a subordinate who is often denied union representation, questioned without witnesses, coerced into signing statements that many times reflect words they never spoke and placed in contexts they never expressed.

Very fortunately for both Mr. Boutris and those who fly in Southwest Airlines aircraft, this security investigation was not typical.  This might be attributed to the fact that Boutris had just days before exposed Mr. G.’s complicity to officials higher up within the agency.  In that complaint, Boutris tied Mr. G. to a former FAA inspector, Mr. P., now working for Southwest and whose employment Boutris had questioned as a potential conflict of interest prior to the events leading to Boutris’ current predicament.  Another possible reason why FAA Security did not conduct their usual lynching may be the sympathetic support Boutris enjoyed from other managers such as Michael Mills.  Or possibly, and in the author’s opinion most likely, the blossoming scandal was rapidly in danger of becoming public.  Mr. G. had violated a couple of cardinal FAA management rules—don’t get caught, and don’t embarrass higher management.  For whatever reason, Boutris found himself cleared of any wrongdoing in very short order.

Now it was Mr. Boutris’ turn to fire back at his accusers—those within agency management, the anonymous Southwest Airlines tipster, and Southwest Airlines themselves.  Congressional testimony gives a hint as to how far up the management chain this conspiracy to violate FAA regulations went.  “In one of the statements that were made by the FAA regarding the operation of the SWA aircraft in revenue service with the overdue AD inspections, it was stated that one FAA inspector looked the other way.  I am here to report that more than one FAA inspector along with FAA management have been looking the other way for years.  No supervisor can do what my supervisor was doing without the support from fellow inspectors, the support of the Division Management Team (who were fully aware of what was going on) and I believe with the support from some people in Washington.  This should be obvious, I was the only maintenance inspector that kept finding and raising these safety concerns since 2003, and when they were elevated to the Division Management Team nothing was done about it.  Every time I pointed out to (Mr. G.) that he was not following our mandated guidance regarding safety violations in the presence of the office manager Mr. Mills, (Mr. G.) would respond that our guidance was outdated and that he was talking to Jim Ballough (Director, Flight Standards)….”

Boutris went on to testify, “Mr. Mills always looked into my safety concerns and supported my findings; however, every time he elevated them to the Division Management Team at the Regional Office he received no support.  Under the circumstances that I just described, no matter how good of a manager a person is, without upper management support the system makes him ineffective.”

The other hero identified in this chapter is Douglas E. Peters.  He validated everything Boutris was saying about Southwest, and he refused to back off even when threatened with not only his job, but also the job of his wife.  That is correct—the careers of both Peters and his FAA-employed wife were directly threatened by an FAA manager.

When the heat got too much for upper FAA management, both the SWA CMO manager and PMI were temporarily removed.  The agency placed as acting manager of the SWA CMO Mr. H..  Mr. H. one day stopped by Peters’ office and sat down for a chat.  Peters mentioned that he would be sending to Mr. H. a memo detailing the unethical behavior within the SWA CMO of several inspectors.  He told Mr. H. he was doing so because it was, “… the right thing to do.”

Mr. H. verbally agreed, repeating the same words.  But as he stood to leave, Mr. H. picked up a picture of Peters’ son.  “This is what’s important, family and flying,” Mr. H. remarked.  He pointed toward another picture, a portrait of the entire Peters family.  “This is what is important,” he repeated.  Then came the bombshell.  “You have a good job here and your wife has a good job over at the Dallas FSDO.  I’d hate to see you jeopardize your and her careers trying to take down a couple of losers.”

The message from upper FAA management was clear—Douglas Peters should consider job security for both himself and his wife over his sworn duty to protect the flying public.  Managers higher up the food chain would not tolerate any more public embarrassments.

Indeed, so ingrained was this look-the-other-way culture within FSDO that Mills quoted Mr. T., FAA Assistant Manager for the American Airlines CMO, as saying, “In the air carrier world you have to make deals.”

That one quote says it all.  In the world of air carrier regulation FAA managers expect inspectors to make deals involving the safety and security of the flying public.

copyright © 2011 R. Doug Wicker

No portions of this article are to be used, quoted, copied, or retransmitted without the permission of the author.

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